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Abstract. In the past years technological advances such as the increas-
ing bandwidth in network infrastructures and new software developments
such as message and agent-based systems gave rise to the field of cloud
technologies, which have evolved from abstract concepts to concrete so-
lutions, ranging from flexible, platform-independent systems to highly
specialized software solutions. In this paper we introduce and evaluate
two anomaly detection methods to achieve a higher level of security in
a specific cloud solution for interactive media, the Media Cloud from
Alcatel-Lucent [9]. The Media Cloud focuses on real-time processing of
interactive media applications, allowing for optimal resource planning
using highly specific functional components. The proposed anomaly de-
tection methods are designed to work complimentary to each other and
are capable of detecting known and unknown vulnerabilities and security
issues, offering very low false positive rates and very high detection rates,
as is shown by the evaluation on real Media Cloud data and synthetic
data. The proposed methods use behavioral and structural features, and
are capable of locating the detected anomalies as well, giving the execut-
ing analyst easy insight into the running processes.
Keywords: Anomaly Detection, Cloud Security, Machine Learning, Graphs
1 Introduction
In the last years, cloud services established themselves as a new and highly
important technology. Due to the advantages of cloud services, noticeable in
lower administrative costs and increased scalability, flexibility and availabil-
ity, this growth will continue. There exist two main service categories of cloud
computing which are relevant for this paper: the Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS)
clouds and Software-as-a-Service clouds (SaaS). PaaS clouds are built of a large
amount of virtual machines and provide access to middleware, run-time envi-
ronments or complete operating systems. Customers of such services use those
virtual machines to set up their own system, without having to care about
maintenance and administration of an own server park. PaaS clouds also of-
fer high flexibility. Virtual machines are easily set up with different operat-
ing systems, enabling an easier development, testing and service deployment
for those platforms. Furthermore the number of managed systems can easily
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be scaled, enabling a flexible reaction to the demands of the market. In the
pre-cloud era, such scalability was only possible with an own server park and
not affordable to smaller or medium sized companies. Examples of PaaS clouds
are the Amazon Elastic Cloud (aws.amazon.com/de/ec2) and the Google App
Engine (developers.google.com/appengine). SaaS clouds have a higher ab-
straction level than PaaS clouds but offer the same kind of scalability. Instead
of providing raw platforms to the customers, a SaaS cloud offers a selection of
pre-installed software services. So the customer does not need to handle the in-
stallation and management of the operating system. Obviously this comes at
the cost of lower flexibility, as only the functions of the pre-installed software
services can be used. Examples of SaaS cloud services are the Amazon Web Ser-
vices (aws.amazon.com) or dedicated media-streaming services like Watchever
(www.watchever.de). More details on cloud technologies are given in the report
of [2].
In this paper we develop and evaluate detection methods for the Alcatel-
Lucent Media Cloud, a PaaS and SaaS cloud solution for media streaming. Its
novel features, illustrated in Section 2, are not yet available on any other PaaS
or SaaS cloud service, combining the flexibility and scalability of classical PaaS
systems with the ease of use and high performance of dedicated media-streaming
SaaS-solutions. While there exist approaches to secure common cloud technolo-
gies, those solutions can not be applied directly to the media cloud infrastruc-
ture. The contributions of this papers are the presentation of two complimentary
methods for the detection and the localization of anomalies in the structure and
in the communication behavior of Alcatel-Lucent Media Cloud applications. The
method for the detection of behavioral anomalies uses features of the communi-
cation of individual components, while the method for the detection of structural
anomalies is based on information of the application graphs. The evaluation of
our method on a set of data of a real Media Cloud application shows very low
false positive rates and true positive rates of up to 100%, while the evaluation
on synthetic data shows reasonable results as well. The rest of this paper is
structured as follows: In Section 2 we present the layout of the Alcatel-Lucent
Media Cloud, its applications and its vulnerabilities. In Section 3 the related
work in the fields of cloud security and anomaly detection methods is discussed.
After giving a short introduction to the utilized learning methods in Section 4,
the detection methods for behavioral and structural anomalies in Media Cloud
applications are elaborated in Sections 5 and 6. The data sets and the evaluation
are presented in Sections 7 and 8, followed by the concluding Section 9.
2 Alcatel Lucent Media Cloud
Combining features of PaaS and SaaS cloud, the Media Cloud offers application
providers a platform for easy development and deployment of large-scale inter-
net services. Consumers are offered a large number of services, and application
service aggregators and cloud service providers are offered an API and platform
for easy composition of similar services. The main focus of Media Cloud appli-
cations is currently interactive media based applications like video conferences
and video calls. Those services do not tolerate delay or lag in the streaming
content. Optimizing the distribution of application components in reaction to
dynamically varying user scenarios has therefore to fulfill very tight constraints.
The following section explains those details of the layout and functionality of
the Media Cloud which are relevant for security issues.
2.1 Media Cloud Layout
The Media Cloud is a framework with the objective to allow the execution of
software services on a widely distributed network of computational resources.
Its main focus is media streaming with a high level of interactivity and real-
time applicability. Its distinctive feature is the possibility to re-map the software
components of an application very fast to different computational resources (i.e.
servers), by using extremely specialized and minimized virtual machines, called
components. As a result, the computational burden of each application can be
moved exactly to computational resources which are closest to the respective
consumer, or to those with a higher capacity. This results in a very high quality
of service, which is not only desirable, but necessary for most real-time media ap-
plications. An application is built by an interconnected set of those components
which communicate with each other using a message system. Each application
contains a core of components which realize the main function of this appli-
cation. For a video chat application those might be components for recording,
encoding, transferring, decoding and displaying video content. Since dynamic be-
havior during runtime is encouraged, however, additional components can easily
be added. For the previous example components for filtering or capturing might
be added, for example. Different application types can use the same type of
component, but the way each application uses this component can differ during
run-time and is defined by the purpose of its application.
2.2 Media Cloud Vulnerabilities
Although the components and applications of the Media Cloud are developed
under strict rules of quality assurance, there exist possibilities for different vul-
nerabilities, mostly caused by insecure application components. From the cloud
computing vulnerabilities listed in the literature [1,26,19], the following are rel-
evant for the Media Cloud.
Data breaches pose a threat for cloud frameworks with shared resources. They
are conducted by using side channel timing information to extract information
from virtual machines on the same server, as described in [28], or via an insuffi-
ciently secure implemented multitenant cloud service database. The vulnerability
for this threat is quite low for the Media Cloud, because generally its components
do not share resources on servers. This could change in future versions, though.
In a running Media Cloud application, data breaches could occur in form of an
unusual communication behavior of single components in terms of message rate
or the amount of traffic, used for transferring data from secured channels, or in
form of unusual connections between individual components, used for example
to transfer data via a specifically vulnerable component interface.
Account or Service Traffic Hijacking via Phishing or Fraud is a risk for the
Media Cloud. Although securing the provided credentials and account informa-
tion is a responsibility of the application service provider or the consumer, one
can not rule out a malicious exploitation of software vulnerabilities of Media
Cloud applications. This correlates directly to insecure interfaces and APIs (e.g.
authentication, access control, encryption). This could be used to maliciously
access media streams, e.g. for eavesdropping on a confidential video conference.
In the running media cloud application such malicious behavior could be visible
as unusual behavior of a specific participant of the video conference, as he tries
to access participants or application components previously not contacted.
Denial of service attacks (DoS) on system resources, e.g. processing power, mem-
ory, disk space or network bandwidth, can decrease service quality or shut down
the system completely. The sophisticated load balancer included in the Media
Cloud takes care of the consequences, but does not find the origin of such at-
tacks, as can be done by our proposed methods. In common network topologies
a DoS attack is executed by using legal actions like HTTP-requests or address-
ing software interfaces, thereby accessing the assigned resources at full capacity
to decrease its quality of service. If this attack is distributed between multi-
ple attackers, the effect is even worse. In the Media Cloud framework multiple
compromised resources, components or applications could be used for sending
a malignant amount of messages to exhaust the application resources, render-
ing the attacked application or resource useless. Again this kind of attack is
detectable in anomalous structures and anomalous patterns of behavior in the
communication of the application.
3 Related Work
Before introducing our proposed anomaly detection method, we start with a
discussion of some related work in the fields of component-based cloud computing
and anomaly detection methods.
3.1 Component-based Cloud Computing
The unique features of the Alcatel-Lucent Media Cloud, compared to other PaaS
and SaaS solutions, are the systematic use of atomic components and the capa-
bility for real-time re-mapping component locations for an optimal distribution
in terms of short transmission paths. To our best knowledge there exists no cloud
solution handling the re-mapping in a comparable way. There exists, however,
one solution which also makes use of atomic components, namely the 4caast
project (4caast.morfeo-project.eu). Its scope is much wider than that of the
media-centric Media Cloud, though, and there are no data sets available to test
our methods on.
3.2 Anomaly Detection Methods
While there exist methods for preventing some of those vulnerabilities relevant
for the Media Cloud, e.g. guidances for secure clouds as in [14,24], they are
not capable of detecting unknown behavioral anomalies of Media Cloud compo-
nents. A proven approach to this problem are anomaly detection methods, which
have been developed in the field of intrusion detection. The anomaly detection
paradigm relies on the possibility to learn a model only over normal data, i.e.
data which represents normal behavior. Once trained the learned model is capa-
ble of detecting behavior that deviates from the normal data and can therefore
be classified as anomalous. Anomaly detection methods have been used for the
detection of anomalies in network traffic [3,16,17], intrusion detection [27,13] or
drive-by-download attacks [8,22], but also in a large amount of other areas, as
nicely described by Chandola et.al. in [5]. Learning with kernels, as described
e.g. by Scho¨lkopf and Smola [20] has been applied to different use cases. For our
proposed structural anomaly detection method, specifically the latest research
on graph kernels (e.g. by Hido et.al. [12]) and research on the detection of anoma-
lies in graphs (e.g. by Eberle et.al. [10]) are interesting. However, none of those
approaches focuses on highly dynamic non-linear, non-planar graph structures,
as is the case for Media Cloud applications.
4 Learning Methods
Kernel methods like the (two-class) Support Vector Machine (e.g. [7,23]) are
known to perform very well in scenarios where both types of data (e.g. benign
vs. malicious, including label information) are available and linearly separable. In
the Media Cloud scenario, however, only the normally behaving data is available,
collected during the normal usage of different applications. For this reason we
decide to use unsupervised one-class support vector methods, which are shortly
explained in the following sections. For further details on the selected methods,
please refer to the cited references.
4.1 One-Class Learning Methods
To our best knowledge, there are two support vector kernel methods fit for one-
class learning: The One-Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) [21] and a
method called Support Vector Data Description (SVDD) [25,6]. Both methods
are unsupervised and aim at learning a model of normality which describes the
training data they are presented with. The One-Class SVM is in its formulation
very similar to the (two-class) Support Vector Machine, except it separates the
training data from the origin of the coordinate system with the largest possible
margin, and not two distinct classes from each other. The intent of the SVDD
however is different: Instead of trying to separate the data from an origin linearly
via a hyperplane, the SVDD learns a sphere encapsulating the training data.
Both learning methods are shortly presented in the following sections.
One-Class Support Vector Machine The objective of the One-Class Sup-
port Vector Machine is to learn a hyperplane which separates the training data
from the origin of the coordinate system. Such a hyperplane can uniquely be
defined by a vector w orthogonal to the hyperplane, which is to be minimized in
order to maximize the margin in between the training data {xi}i=1...N and the
coordinate origin. The primal optimization target is defined as
min
w,b,ξ
1
2
‖w‖2 + C
∑
i
ξi − b (1)
s.t. ∀i wTΦ(xi) ≥ b− ξi
∀i ξi ≥ 0
with C serving as a regularization parameter, trading off the maximization of the
margin width b and training errors ξi caused by data points not being projected
beyond the hyperplane. One usually relies on the kernelized formulation for
training and evaluation, from which the prediction function Equation 2 follows.
A data point x is then classified as anomalous if f(x) < 0.
f(x) =
∑
i
αik(xi, x)− b (2)
Support Vector Data Description The SVDD learns, given a training set
{xi}i=1...N , the smallest possible sphere enclosing that data, defined by a learned
centroid µˆ and a radius R¯. The primal objective function is
min
µˆ,R¯,ξ
R¯+ C
∑
i
ξi (3)
s.t. ∀i ‖Φ(xi)− µˆ‖2 ≤ R¯+ ξi,
∀i ξi ≥ 0, R¯ ≥ 0
Similar to other support vector methods, training and evaluation is usually done
in the method’s dual form, with the following dual prediction function
f(x) = R¯− a(x) (4)
a(x) = k(x, x)− 2
∑
i
αik(xi, x) +
∑
i,j
αiαjk(xi, xj) (5)
Here, a(x) describes the squared euclidean distance between x and µˆ in the fea-
ture space defined by the kernel function k(·, ·). A prediction point x is considered
anomalous if f(x) < 0.
5 Behavioral Anomaly Detection
The motivation for the proposed behavioral anomaly detection method is to
detect anomalous behavior in the monitored components of Media Cloud ap-
plications, corresponding to the vulnerabilities described in Section 2.2. It is
designed to work complimentary to the detection method for structural anoma-
lies, described in Section 6. For this purpose specific parameters of a monitored
Media Cloud application need to be logged. This data can then be used to train
an individual anomaly detector for each monitored component. This detector
is then able to classify new communication data of this component, to detect
anomalies within. The following section describes the required measurements,
the feature representation and the actual application of the one class learning
method for training the detector.
5.1 Measured Values
Applications running in cloud infrastructures need to be highly optimized for the
cloud principles of flexibility and scalability. The applications and components
developed for the the Media Cloud conform to those principles. In terms of
monitoring for security purposes, such applications are harder to track, because
the components are dynamically distributed between different computational
resources. For this reason, the proposed method does not monitor the behavior
of the computational resources or of the applications, but instead it focuses on
the behavior of the measured values at individual components. As elaborated
above, all applications are built using a set of software components. When used
in another instance of the same application type, a component is expected to
behave similar for each instance of this application type. The same component
may however also be used in a different application type, which results in a
different behavior in instances of this different application type.
Vt Description
v1 Avg. CPU time (processes per min)
v2 Avg. Num. of Received Msgs. per sec
v3 Avg. Num. of Sent Msgs. per sec
v4 Avg. Size of Received Msgs.
v5 Avg. Size of Sent Msgs.
Table 1. The values Vt measured on each monitored component.
Thus the behavior of all components of each application instance need to
be monitored. A dictionary stores the type of application per application in-
stance. This allows a consolidation of the data of all instances of the same ap-
plication type during run-time. For each component a tupel of measured values
Vt = {v1, v2, . . . , v5} is logged in a selected time interval (e.g. one second), which
allows a fine grained monitoring of the behavior of the individual components.
The values where selected to be able to represent maliciously behaving com-
munication, e.g. in terms of anomalous message rates or message sizes. Table 1
describes those measured values. An increasing number of received messages per
second (v2) might for example point to a DoS-attack.
5.2 Feature Representation
The selected learning method requires a vector representation of the data for
training and prediction. Although sparse feature representations have been eval-
uated as well, and were promising for their special properties (e.g. encoding the
temporal development into a spatial representation), a dense feature representa-
tion has shown the overall best performance. The behavioral anomaly detection
method is designed to effectively make use of the temporal development of the
measured values. Therefore the feature mapping is based on a projection func-
tion m(t) over a sliding window of size s. For each time t there are measured
values Vt = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5}t available. The projection function utilizes Vt and
the s− 1 previous datapoints {Vt−1, . . . , Vt−(s−1)} to map the measured values
onto a new 5s-dimensional data vector, containing information about the tempo-
ral development within this sliding window. This projection defines a new data
point xt at time t as
xt = m(t) = {vi,t} (6)
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, t ∈ {1, . . . , s− 1}
i.e.
m(t) = {v1, . . . , v5︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vt
, . . .︸︷︷︸
Vt−1
, . . . , . . .︸︷︷︸
Vt−(s−2)
, v1, . . . , v5︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vt−(s−1)
}
The motivation behind these features is to model the general dynamic be-
havior of the different values V , because attacks to the Media Cloud system, as
those described in Section 2.2, would cause the values to behave differently than
usual, for a longer period of time.
5.3 Prediction of Anomaly Scores
Although Section 4 presented two different methods for using support vector
machines for anomaly detection, in case of the behavioral anomaly detection
method it is sufficient to use the One Class SVM method. We are using gaussian
radial basis function kernels, defined as follows
k(x, x′) = exp
(
γ‖x− x′‖22
)
(7)
γ = − 1
2σ2
because the resulting models are proven to be equivalent to the smallest
enclosing high-dimensional hypersphere around the provided data points, as de-
fined in the SVDD-approach by Tax [25], which means evaluating the One Class
SVM method is sufficient in this case. As described in Section 4.1, the One-Class
SVM learns a model for a hyperplane separating the projected data from the
point of origin. As discussed in Section 5.1, the behavioral anomaly detection
focuses on learning a model based on specific extracted features of the data for
each combination of components and application class. The final one-class model
describes those sets of normal data. For the classification of a new data point x
at a time point t, denoted as xt, the function f(xt) calculates an anomaly score,
which is based on the distance of xt from the hyperplane, i.e.
f(xt) =
∑
i
αik(xi, xt) (8)
where k(xi, xt) is the RBF kernel function and αi are the learned support vector
weights. To predict, whether xt is normal or anomalous, the threshold b (in-
troduced in equation (2)) on the anomaly score is defined for each model. The
threshold is calibrated on a validation data set, with the objective to achieve the
lowest possible false positive ratio. The actual prediction p(xt) is then conducted
with the function
p(xt) = sign(f(xt)− b) (9)
where xt is anomalous if p(xt) < 0 and otherwise normal. In practice, each
component of each Media Cloud Application has to provide such training and
validation data. Once the anomaly detector of each component is trained, the
detector is coupled with this component, monitoring its behavior and raising an
alarm, if an anomaly is detected.
6 Structural Anomaly Detection
The structural anomaly detection method is designed to work complimentary to
the detection method for behavioral anomalies, described in Section 5. Instead
of using timelines of specific measured values, it learns a model for each ap-
plication, based on logs of the dynamically changing application graph, i.e. the
interconnected components within each application, to detect anomalies visible
in this graph structure, as described in Section 2.2. Once the model is learned,
anomalous components and anomalous connections between components can be
detected. Furthermore the anomaly can be located, due to the use of additive
kernels and a sum-pooled explicit feature representation for retracing the ori-
gins of the classification decision. The following sections elaborate the feature
presentation, the actual prediction of anomalies and the methods used to locate
the predicted anomalies within the graph.
6.1 Feature Representation
Our data consists of structural snapshots of the application at times of mea-
surement in form of highly-interconnected graph structures. We use standard
graph notation, describing our graph structures G = (V,E) as a pair of labeled
nodes V and directed edges E ⊆ V × V . The concept of Bag of Substructures
is closely related to the Bag of Words representation of documents used in nat-
ural language processing: In essence, a BoS representation counts numbers of
occurrences of discrete subunits present within an input graph structure. Let G
denote a graph structure to be projected into the BoS feature space and s denote
a substructure contained within G, consisting of a set of nodes Vs and edges Es.
The calculation of a BoS feature is then defined as
x =
∑
s∈G
1m(s) (10)
where m(s) describes a mapping function relating the substructure s to a di-
mension d in BoS feature space. The final BoS representation of G is then a
sum-aggregation of all binary indicator vectors 1d which contain an entry 1 in
dimension d and 0 otherwise.
The class of substructures we consider are degree-1-neighborhoods around
each node within an input graph. The neighborhood of 1st degree around a se-
lected node u contains all nodes v which share a direct edge connection with
u, regardless of the direction of those edges, as well as the node u itself. Those
nodes Vs = u ∪ {v}, together with all edges Es = {{v′, v}|{v′, v} ∈ E ∧ v′ ∈
Vs ∧ v ∈ Vs} connecting the nodes from within Vs to capture clique-structures
as well, define our neighborhood substructures s = (Vs, Es). By ignoring edge
directions while expanding the neighborhoods, and due to the extraction of one
neighborhood for each node within the graph, information about missing con-
nections can be encoded into the feature vector and is therefore locatable later
on.
Our choice of 1st degree neighborhoods is grounded on their range of expres-
siveness. They fully include sequences and arbitrarily connected substructures
containing up to three nodes, and they partially include larger structures, espe-
cially around highly-interconnected cliques and nodes with high edge degrees.
Other than the degree of neighborhood expansion, the substructures are not re-
stricted in size and are therefore capable of describing forks within the graph
structure, as well as the cardinality thereof. Another argument is their low com-
putational complexity: Calculating the full set of substructures for a graph G can
be done in O(n), with n being the number of nodes in G. Using appropriate data
structures for G and hashing functions for m(·) (e.g. Liu et.al. [18]), mapping
a graph into a vector space is near-instantaneous – an important property for
monitoring a system in real-time. We found binarized and normalized features
to perform best with both considered kernel methods.
6.2 Prediction and Localization of Anomaly Scores
Both kernel methods described in Section 4 use a thresholded prediction function
f(x) to determine a prediction point x as normal or an outlier. The respective
thresholds can either be learned [21,25] or set manually to satisfy given demands
on available normal data. We follow the latter, more practical approach, which
allows us to adapt the classifier to the required use-case. In day-to-day operation
with numerous instances of multiple application types active in the cloud, the
classification threshold is set to a low false positive rate, to raise alarms only in
the most severe situations. Once an in-depth monitoring of critical applications
is required, higher false positive rates are acceptable in order to increase the
sensitivity of the classifier.
While the prime objective of our system is the detection of anomalous sub-
structures in application graphs, we are also very interested in the exact location
of this substructure, i.e. we wish to rate nodes and edges individually according
to their contribution to the graph’s prediction value. In case a graph is com-
pletely structurally unrelated to the data previously trained on, the cause of the
anomaly rating is evident. However, as in [11], we expect most anomalies to be
local phenomena, affecting only small subsets of nodes and edges, whereas the
majority of the graph structure remains true to the expectation of the learned
model. Considering the potential dimensions of the non-planar MediaCloud ap-
plication graphs, counting well above 150 highly interconnected components, a
localized threat assessment in order to reduce the processing time for the ad-
ministrators is extremely relevant.
Due to the Bag of Substructures feature extraction we know that each di-
mension in BoS space corresponds to a unique structural confirmation of nodes
and edges. By restricting our choice of kernel functions to the family of sum-
decomposable kernels for training and classification, the value produced by the
prediction functions f(x) can be naturally decomposed into differential contribu-
tions for each dimension d of the prediction point x. We regard a kernel function
as sum-decomposable, if an equivalent formulation based on kernel functions
acting on single input dimensions exists, i.e. such that the kernel function has
the property
k(x, x′) =
∑
d
k(x(d), x′(d)) (11)
with x(d) describing the value of dimension d in data point x. Two kernel func-
tions meeting the above criterion have been used for our method, namely the
histogram intersection kernel and the linear kernel. A decomposition of the linear
kernel in accordance to equation (11) is
k(x, x′) = 〈x, x′〉 =
∑
d
x(d)x′(d) (12)
For the histogram intersection kernel the required decomposition is already
provided via the kernel function’s definition:
k(x, x′) =
∑
d
min(x(d), x′(d)) (13)
In the remainder of this section we will discuss a decomposition of the predic-
tion functions f(x) into scores for each substructure extracted from a graph and
finally anomaly ratings for individual nodes and edges. The proposed decompo-
sition is calculated as a series of consecutive steps and can be understood as an
inversion of the classification pipeline from the data point as a graph structure
towards the prediction of the classifier. The resulting localized threat indica-
tion for graph substructures can then be visualized in order to allow a quick
identification of the sources of structural error.
Dimensional Prediction: SVDD The prediction function (4) of the SVDD
consists of the learned radius R¯ minus a function a(x) describing the squared
euclidean distance between the prediction point x and the learned centroid µˆ.
In order to identify the local sources of the graph’s anomaly score we ignore the
thresholding in f(x) and concentrate on the decomposition of function a(x), de-
scribing the distance between the learned centroid µˆ and the point x, into dimen-
sional contributions g(x)(d) of single input dimensions. Using sum-decomposable
kernels as in equation (11) yields for each dimension d the predicted value
g(x)(d) = k(x(d), x(d))−
∑
i
αik(x
(d)
i , x
(d)) +
∑
i,j
αiαjk(x
(d)
i , x
(d)
j ) (14)
Dimensional Prediction: One-Class Support Vector Machine Similar to
the case of the SVDD, we are interested in the origins of the prediction and do
again ignore the additive bias term. In contrast to the prediction of the SVDD,
the OCSVM, without the thresholding, describes the benignity of a prediction
point x: The better a vector x describes the direction w orthogonal to the hyper-
plane, the higher the predicted value. Dimensional predictions g(x)(d) yielding
low values therefore indicate a lack of benignity whereas higher values represent
expected graph structures. We use the definition in equation (11) in conjunc-
tion with an arbitrary sum-decomposable kernel function to obtain dimensional
scores
g(x)(d) =
∑
i
αik(x
(d)
i , x
(d)) (15)
Local Score Projection We have at this point calculated predictions for each
dimension of x. Our next objective is the assignment of those scores to groups of
nodes and edges matching the substructures representing the predicted dimen-
sions in BoS space. To each substructure s contained within G and considered
by the feature extraction scheme, we assign a fraction q(s) of the prediction
g(x)(m(s)). Here m(s) is the same mapping function as used in equation (10),
relating a structure s to the index of a dimension in BoS space. To take the
sum-aggregation used in equation (10) into account we define that fraction to
correspond to the weighted contribution of s to x(m(s)) during the BoS feature
calculation:
q(s) =
g(x)(m(s))
x(m(s))
(16)
The substructure scores q(s) are then mapped onto compatible node- and
edge-configurations by averaging, to consider varying coverage of different parts
of the graph by the scope of the extracted substructures. This results in predic-
tions r(o) for all node and edge objects o ∈ G:
r(o) =
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
q(s) ; S = {s|o ∈ s} (17)
The set S describes all extracted substructures covering the current node- or
edge-object o. For models obtained using an SVDD the calculations of local
predictions are finalized at this point. For the sake of consistency we convert the
local benignity ratings obtained in case of the OCSVM into anomaly ratings, or
rather a lack of benignity, by assigning to each o the difference between the score
of the most benign node or edge and r(o).
r(o)mal = −r(o) + max{r(o)}∀o∈G (18)
Prior to visualization local prediction scores r(o) are scaled such that r(o) ∈
[0, 1] ∀o. Depending on the mode of operation one can consider either all o within
the scope of a single graph, or alternatively a set of graphs. We normalize as
r′(o) =
r(o)
max{r(o)}∀o∈G (19)
using G here either as a single graph or a combination of multiple graphs. Note
that due to exclusion of the thresholding from both classifiers and the conversion
to anomaly ratings in case of the OCSVM all prediction scores r(o) and r′(o)
are always larger than or equal to zero. We visualize the predictions by linearly
mapping the (normalized) prediction scores to some color map of choice.
7 Data sets
For testing both proposed methods, a realistic Media Cloud video conference
application has been executed multiple times, each run having a length of 10
minutes. In each run the values vt have been logged with a sampling rate of 1
sec. Two sets of data have been created. The first set of runs, aimed at testing
the behavioral anomaly detection, focuses on a higher variance in the amount of
background processes, resulting in multiple runs consisting of up to 57 compo-
nents and 18000 events on average. The second data set, aimed at the structural
anomaly detection, focuses on the number of connected devices, and does there-
fore incorporate up to 160 components, while the number of tracked events is
only 6112. This specific data set also incorporates logs of the dynamically chang-
ing graph structure.
7.1 Data sets for behavioral anomaly detection
The measured values of the components show only a very small variance. Figure
1(a) shows the normalized values for the single most active component, a cen-
tral video-encoding component. The values show an overall small variance and
no specifically dynamic behavior like ascending or descending sections within.
There is also no anomalous data available in those logs, to empirically evaluate
the detection performance of the behavioral detection method. To address this
problem, the real data has been used to craft a more dynamic version, as well
as an anomalous data set.
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Fig. 1. Different examples of measured timeseries.
To achieve a more dynamically behaving time series, the timelines of the
real data are combined with parametric sigmoid functions, allowing for smooth
dynamic gradients. To achieve more variance in the anomalous data, random
gaussian noise has been added there. The required variance is derived from the
statistics of the video conference data. The dynamic behavior realized by the
sigmoid functions follows a Media Cloud paradigm, which allows the activity
of application components to be dynamically decreasing or increasing during
run-time - a behavior unfortunately not occurring in our data set. Figure 1(b)
depicts examples of different simulated time series measurements of a single Vt.
The values are normalized and show a non-dynamic (Normal 1 ) timeline with
constant behavior, as found in the video conference data, and a dynamic version
(Normal 2 ) of normal data simulating a dynamic increase and decrease of the
measured value, as it may occur when a specific activity of this component is
triggered. The plot Anomaly 1 represents a relatively short burst of anomalous
activity, as it may be perceived due to data breaches or malfunctioning com-
ponents, while Anomaly 2 represents a much wider temporal range of activity,
perceivable in the case of traffic hijacking or DoS-attacks.
7.2 Data sets for structural anomaly detection
Media Cloud Video Conference Data Set results from recording a real video
conference session with up to 6 concurrent users. It consists of 14 unique graph
structures captured over the time, representing structural changes within the ap-
plication. In this scenario a change in the application structure occurs whenever
a participant joins or leaves the session. Each user is featured within the applica-
tion graph by a core structure of connected components, as well as a dynamically
changing chain of components reserved to connect to and communicate with the
respective counter parts of other present users. In order to build a realistic yet
larger training set we have drawn random graphs from the recording 400 times.
This data set features average node counts of 80.1 and average edge counts of
119.2 per graph, and an average node degree of 2.9 per node and up to 160
components connected with 256 edges for the largest graph structure.
Synthetic Data Set has been created in order to create a richer data set in the
sense of size, complexity and number of unique graphs. This has been done by
using the recorded graph instances, manually analyzing their structural patterns
and using a generator to construct graph structures adhering to those rules. This
data set features average node counts of 119.2 and average edge counts of 194.1
per graph, as well as an average node degree of 3.3 per node, with the largest
graph consisting of 516 components connected with 924 edges.
8 Evaluation
The evaluation of the methods for behavioral and structural anomaly detection
is conducted on the data sets described in Section 7. Since each method focuses
on different aspects of the data set, each method is evaluated individually.
8.1 Behavioral Anomaly Detection
For all experiments the behavior of the ten most active components has been
used. The average number of samples was 570. Since each application run has
been executed multiple times, the data has been separated to obtain individual
data sets for training, validation and testing. Finally the results presented in the
following section are averaged over the ten different components. To achieve an
optimal representation of the behavioral characteristics over time, the parameter
s, responsible for the size of the sliding window, is of crucial relevance. The exper-
iments described below are conducted using a range of values for s ∈ [20, 160].
Shorter values do not represent the temporal development adequately. Larger
values, on the other hand, are not required, as they do not further improve the
results. Analyzing the range of s allows deeper insights into the temporal re-
quirements and characteristics of the simulated Media Cloud data, and allows
conclusions about ways to handle them in practice.
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Fig. 2. Average True Positive rates at different window for the four experiments.
In all of the following experiments, depicted in Figure 2, the false positive
rate is well below 1%, and for the optimal models even at 0%. The achieved
true positive rates are much more interesting. The first experiment, Normal 1
vs. Anomaly 1 utilizes the correspondingly modified distributions, depicted in
Figure 1(b), i.e. no dynamical behavior is added to the video conference data.
The resulting model is then tested against other runs of Normal 1 as well as
data modified according to Anomaly 1., The true positive rate starts at a value
of 86% at s = 20 and approaches its optimum of 100% already at s = 60. In
comparison with the other experiments, this is the smallest optimal value for
s. The second experiment based on the non-dynamic normal data is the one
of Normal 1 vs. Anomaly 2. This time the anomalous behavior covers a wider
duration, and requires also a larger window size of s = 100 to be detectable
at 100%. Both of those results are rather intuitive, because they represent the
simplest experiments possible, based on a model of nearly constant normal data
which deviates strongly from the applied anomalies. In fact it is so simple, that a
threshold-based baseline detector would have been capable of an identical, if not
better performance. Before discussing the experiments which are based on the
dynamic time series Normal 2, it is important to note that none of the different
applied window sizes is large enough to represent any of the dynamical curves as
a whole in a single feature. Instead, only subsections of the curve are represented
as individual features. In the experiments based on the data modified according
to Normal 2, which shows a specific dynamic behavior, strongly deviant from
the one of Normal 1, the results are much more interesting. Because the normal
data already contains decreasing and increasing gradients, a simple threshold-
based baseline detector is not able to differ the normal data Normal 2 from the
anomalous time series Anomaly 1 and Anomaly 2. It could be applied if the
peak of the anomalous data would deviate from the peak of the normal data,
enabling at least the detection of this deviation. But this is intentionally not the
case here. The proposed method, however, is still capable of a detection rate of
100%. And while Anomaly 2 requires a value of s = 160 to reach its optimum,
the detection of the narrower Anomaly 1 works at the previously favored value
of s = 100. Those results show that the proposed method allows the detection of
anomalies with varying and dynamical behavior, even if the underlying normal
data is much more dynamic than the current data logs suggest.
On both sets the detection performance achieved on Anomaly 2 was generally
better with a larger window. To enable the detection of anomalies which require
different window sizes, it is therefore recommended to take the largest value
that is still practically feasible. The practical feasibility strongly depends on the
scenario the proposed detection method is used in. If an administrator is actively
analyzing a running Media Cloud system, larger window sizes help to find all
kinds of anomalies, at the cost of the temporal delay of such a large window.
If on the other hand immediate alarms are required during run-time, a shorter
window size is advised, at the cost of a sub-optimal detection of anomalies with
a longer duration. It is also useful to analyze the normal data, because in the
case of a low degree of dynamic behavior, a smaller window size is sufficient.
8.2 Graph Anomaly Detection
For both data sets, four experiments have been conducted, targeting one kind
of anomaly similar to those considered in [11] – removed nodes or edges , added
nodes or edges at unexpected locations, changed structures as redirected edges
or an inverted sequence of nodes which is a combination of the former two
anomalies, as well as a combination of all mentioned kinds (mixed). For each data
set and anomaly category one training set as in Section 7.2 and one evaluation
set has been generated. The same procedure has been used for the evaluation
and for the test set, followed by a modification of around 10% of the benign
graphs according to the anomaly category, such that a given edit distance (5 for
the recorded data, 8 for the synthetic data) is not exceeded.
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(c) Synthetic Data: graph-wise prediction
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Fig. 3. ROC-curves and AUC-values for graph-wise and local predictions for the real
recordings and synthetic data.
For a SVDD classifier using a histogram intersection kernel we achieve per-
fect prediction accuracy, as visualized in the ROC-curves in in Figure 3(a). Even
though the detection of anomalous graphs is flawless and without any false-
positives neccesary, we can not gain perfect local predictions on individual graphs
and edges. This is caused by the size of the substructures used during the feature
extraction phase. In order to expressively capture the graph, the substructure
features cover several connected nodes and edges, which limits the resolution of
the local prediction approach introduced in Section 6.2. While larger neighbor-
hood features might be able to even better describe the structure of a graph, the
resolution for the local predictions might further diminish due to anomaly scores
being projected on all covered nodes and edges, not only onto the covered part
of the anomalous substructure, as visualized in Figure 4. Reducing the size of
our neighborhood features would result in single nodes as substructures, which
makes a classification of anomalous structures impossible. Predictions on the
more complex synthetic data set seem less trivial, especially for the more com-
plex anomaly types changed and mixed. This slight loss in prediction accuracy,
as well as the relative difficulty of the generated anomalies reflects well in the
quality of the local predictions of both data sets. For those reason the 1st-degree
neighborhood is an optimal solution.And although the detection performance
for the synthetic data set, depicted in Figure 3 is not optimal, those highlighted
nodes are still perfectly usable by an analyzing administrator, since all of them
are clustered around the real anomalous center nodes and can be interpreted as
components potentially at risk.
Using the One-Class-SVM as a classifier yields comparable results for both
data sets, as well as graph-wise and local predictions.
Fig. 4. Excerpts of visualizations of local predictions on graph structures, focused on
anomalous substructures. The fill color of nodes and edges indicates the local threat
prediction based on the classifier, while the borders of nodes indicate their, and inter-
mediate edges’ expected ground truth label. Shades of red correspond to an increased
threat rating and correspond to the threat values displayed as floating point values on
each node. In the left plot the anomaly is caused by the the node labeled crop placed
in between vc2gr and scale. The right plot shows an anomaly caused by the replication
of the node labelled rtpmp4vpay.
8.3 Evasion
When talking about anomaly detection methods, inevitably the risk of evasion
needs to be addressed. The big assumption of anomaly detection methods is
that the data, which is used to train the normal model, actually contains mostly
normal data. Fortunately support vector machines are able to handle noisy data
relatively robust and can be modified to be even more robust, as was shown
by Biggio et.al. in [4]. The most troublesome scenario occurs when using online
learning, i.e. updating the model regularly, based on new data. Under those
circumstances an adversary could iteratively poison the model, by increasing
the amount of anomalous data in the normal data pool. But even for those most
dangerous situations, an attack would fail due to impracticability, as was shown
by Kloft et.al. in [15].
9 Conclusion
In this paper we propose and evaluate two complimentary learning-based method
for the detection of different dynamic and security-relevant anomalies in the
Alcatel-Lucent Media Cloud. The proposed methods use behavioral and struc-
tural features and are also capable of locating the detected anomalies. In the
evaluation we show on a data set of synthetic and real Media Cloud data per-
fect detection performances of up to 100% true positive rate and very low false
positive rates. This holds even when training on highly dynamic normal data.
Furthermore we provide insight into the required learning and kernel methods,
as well as additional advice on how to configure this system in different prac-
tical scenarios. Overall we conclude that our framework is a viable solution for
detecting anomalies in Alcatel-Lucent Media Cloud Applications.
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